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Rethinking Audit and Inspection 
 
Michael Rustin 
 
 
Abstract  This paper  criticises the dominant systems of public service  
audit, arguing that they are undermining belief in  the public sector.   
He proposes  instead   more constructive forms of inspection, which  
give  emphasis to working together for improvement rather to   
regulation through sanctions and competition.   
 
 
It has become conventional wisdom since the beginning of New Labour’s 
second term that the government’s success depends on whether it can bring 
about tangible improvements in public services, such as health, education, 
and transport. It has gone about the task through significant increases in 
spending, and by establishing a draconian regime of target-setting, regulation 
and inspection. Its methods of managing the public sector have largely 
followed precedents established by previous Conservative governments, in its 
commitment to market mechanisms wherever these can be introduced, and to 
central regulatory controls where they can’t. Alan Finlayson, in recent issues 
of Soundings (23 and 24) and in his Making Sense of New Labour (2003), 
has documented the ideology of ‘modernisation’ and the doctrines of ‘new 
public management’ which underpin its policies. 1 
 
                                            
1
 In a valuable discussion of ‘new public management’, Alan Finlayson (Making Sense of New 
Labour, Lawrence and Wishart 2003) has contrasted an earlier civil service model of 
bureaucratic hierarchy and probity with new systems which devolve responsibility to separate 
units and sub-agencies, and devise measures which enable managers at these dispersed or 
subordinate levels to be controlled at a distance. Inspection regimes are a key part of this new 
management system. The devolution of responsibilities to managers, with devolved budgets 
as a prime instrument, passes responsibility to them while denying them support. Such 
regimes often involve ‘de-layering’ or stripping out levels of management. In effect these 
assumptions undermine the idea that containing and supportive structures are what sustain 
good practice, and substitute  models which depend on reward and punishment. 
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This article argues that this approach is self-destructive in many respects. 
The government, and Tony Blair in particular, are seeking to ‘rescue’ and 
‘modernise’ the public sector by, so to speak, campaigning against much of 
what it actually is and does. This ceaseless critique erodes public confidence 
in the very idea of a public sector even while the government is supposedly 
demonstrating that it alone can make it work. Its continuous criticism and 
fault-finding also has the effect of alienating the public sector workforce, 
which becomes defensive and fearful when it should be the government’s 
most enthusiastic ally in the search for improvement. In particular, the article 
examines the ‘micro-regimes’ of regulation which have become so important 
to the government’s ‘delivery strategy’, and the pervasive systems of audit 
and inspection which now plague every inch of the public sector – to which 
huge resources of money and time are being diverted, away from the primary  
services themselves. I argue against the goals of competitive ranking and 
‘consumer choice’ which unduly dominate these audits and inspections. I 
propose  instead that these procedures should be designed to facilitate 
improvement, innovation and learning, and to create alliances between 
service providers, service-users, and citizens in support of public goods that 
all can identify with. Only if there is a change in the present systems of 
regulation of these services can public confidence in them be restored, and 
the idea of the public good on which social democracy depends be renewed. 
 
Audit and inspection 
Audit and Inspection has become an increasingly important element in the 
operation of the public services in the last decade or so, as everyone who 
works in these services well knows. OFSTED, CHI (shortly to become CHAI), 
QUAHE, SSI, HM Inspectorate of Prisons – there is an inspectorate for each 
field of public services, with the Audit Commission itself at the top of this 
hierarchy, with its broader remit and responsibility for local government. There 
are also the inspection agencies – OFCOM, OFWAT et al – which emerged to 
regulate formerly public but now private infrastructural industries. In 1994 
Michael Power published a widely-noticed Demos pamphlet, The Audit 
Explosion, which drew attention to this burgeoning phenomenon, and pointed 
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out the discrepancy between the claims made for it and the evidence for its 
effectiveness. In 2002, Onora O’Neill’s Reith Lectures, published under the 
title A Question of Trust, drew attention to the distrust of professionals 
inherent in the rise of the regulatory culture, and gave a measured dissenting 
voice to the professional employees who have felt themselves to be primary 
targets of the new inspection system, including of course academics. The 
choice of this topic and of its lecturer by the BBC were a sensitive index of the 
level of concern and opposition which these new regulatory systems have 
evoked in what one could describe as ‘middle Britain’, though this is not quite 
what Tony Blair means by this term. 
 
In the face of criticism and resistance in the various public services, there has 
of late been some softening of the methods and approaches adopted to 
inspection and audit, in its largest spheres of education and health. There is 
talk of a ‘lighter touch’ by inspectors, and of the earning of partial exemption 
from the most rigorous inspecting routines for institutions that meet various 
criteria of quality in first audits. The conversion of CHI, the Commission for 
Health Improvement, into CHAI, the Commission for Healthcare Audit and 
Inspection, is accompanied by new broader aims and guidelines which look 
likely to be an improvement on those of CHI, whose focus on ‘governance’ 
(i.e. administrative procedures) was unduly narrow from the start. But there is 
little evidence that there has been any fundamental rethinking of purpose in 
these modifications of practice. It seems rather that the aim is to reduce the 
levels of conflict with institutions, also perhaps the burgeoning of  these 
systems, while preserving their essential character. The question is, are such 
minor changes enough? Is the current system of audit, regulation and 
inspection founded on sound principles? Have alternative ways of conceiving 
and operating the system been put forward and debated? I shall suggest in 
this article that they have not,  but should be.  
 
Origins and purposes of inspection systems  
The origins of our present systems plainly lie in part in the deep distrust of 
public service provision by the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 
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1990s. Public services were regarded by them as unaccountable to the public 
or to consumers, and as having been ‘captured’ by producer interests, both 
professional and trade union. The lack of ‘consumer choice’ in the delivery of 
many public services was contrasted with its importance in the spheres of 
private consumption. The absence of the disciplines of competition and the 
market were noted as an inefficient aspect of public provision. Some 
important goods were transferred in bulk by the Thatcher government from 
the public to the private sectors, notably council housing, through the ‘right to 
buy’ legislation. But government recognised that other services, such as 
school, health, and social services, could not easily be privatised, whether for 
political or operational reasons. Alternative strategies were therefore 
developed, either to bring market or quasi-market disciplines to bear on these 
services (‘internal markets’ in the NHS, compulsory tendering in local 
government), or to bring about greater public accountability for their 
performance. Inspection and audit systems were the principal means chosen 
for achieving this greater public accountability. However, by establishing 
common and public measures of performance and relative merit (‘league 
tables’ and the award of ‘stars’) these audit systems were also used to 
enhance and enforce competition, by increasing the information available to 
individual consumers to make their choices of service-provider.  
 
Inspection and audit systems can have – and indeed usually combine – a 
number of different purposes. One of the problems of recent British systems 
is that their development seems to have been accompanied by no significant 
public debate about what these different purposes might be.. Although one of 
the main principles which justifies the entire regulatory system is the necessity 
for ‘evidence-based practice’, the regulatory system seems itself to have 
developed with little interest in, the evidence of its effectiveness. One would 
have expected such an important engine of government to have been 
developed by means of a lengthy process of experiment, research, and 
debate, but this has not been the case.2 
                                            
2
 One of the principal influences on the development of audit regimes in the public sector has 
been movements for quality assurance and ‘total quality management’ in manufacturing 
industry, and subsequently in other fields of business. Here also changes have been 
  
  
 
5 
 
We could identify the legitimate goals of these inspection systems as broadly 
falling into three categories: raising common agreed standards of 
performance; measuring comparative performance; and improving quality. 
 
Raising common standards 
Ensuring that common agreed standards of performance and output are met 
by institutions and their sub-units is a substantial undertaking in itself. It 
requires that such standards and objectives are first determined and agreed, 
and then specified in terms which enable their achievement to be reliably 
measured.  
 
In some areas of provision, such as primary education, anxiety that such 
standards and objectives were not being widely met was a shaping influence 
on the inspection system. The development of the National Curriculum and its 
various component devices (the national literacy and numeracy hours, etc), 
and the devising of earlier and more frequent Key Stage assessments, were 
closely associated with the development of the OFSTED inspection regime, 
one of whose purposes was to ensure that the goals specified by these 
measures were fulfilled by all schools.  
 
But in other areas of provision, such as university education, the aim of 
ensuring that agreed common standards were met was a rather weak 
justification for the elaborate systems introduced. There seemed little reason 
for general concern about academic standards in universities at the time 
when the current Quality Assurance regime was introduced. And, once 
instituted, the inspection regime began to find that the vast majority of 
programmes and institutions inspected were achieving standards deemed to 
be satisfactory or better. The dire effects of the 40% reduction in funding-per-
                                                                                                                             
propagated by charismatic advocates – management educators and ideas-people – but they 
have mostly not been warranted as scientific innovations would have been by empirical 
research. Thus questions remain about the transferability of such methods from their source-
contexts. See Adrian Wilkinson and Hugh Colin (eds), Making Quality Critical, Routledge 
1995; and Colin Morgan and Stephen Murgatroyd, Total Quality Management in the Public 
Sector, Open University Press 1994. 
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student over 20 years then passed unnoticed by the inspection system,  and 
has only now been acknowledged as a problem  to justify top-up fees.   
 
In the sphere of health, it has proved more difficult to define and determine 
what acceptable standards and goals of provision are, since these depend on 
complex measures of rates of mortality and recovery, and on the relative 
costs of treatment in systems which are necessarily very different from one 
another. A health service is a conglomerate of specialisms related to each 
other in complex networks of co-operation and interdependency, not a unified 
production system producing an easily standardised or classifiable output. 
The ‘outputs’ of such systems are millions of individual patients or ex-patients, 
not composite products like Toyota cars or Boeing aircraft. If there is a 
defective element in the production system for a vehicle, it is going to degrade 
the standard of the whole product, perhaps fatally. But although specialisms 
are interdependent in health systems, it is unlikely to be obvious how the 
output of a whole system is being affected by its different parts. It is perhaps 
partly for this reason that the inspection and accountability systems in the 
NHS have so far devoted so much of their attention to secondary measures of 
quality, such as ‘waiting lists’, or to procedural measures, such as 
‘governance’, rather than to the measures that matter most, such as the 
effectiveness and cost of treatments. The medical profession does manifest 
its keen interest in the latter in the pages of The Lancet and the British 
Medical Journal,  but methods of comparative medical audit are still resisted.  
 
Where public services deal with populations who are in some respect 
‘residual’ in their characteristics, as opposed to those representing a cross-
section of the people (like health, schools and universities), their inspection 
systems have different priorities. In Her Majesty’s Prisons, and in the Social 
Services, the achievement  of adequate minimum standards has been a 
matter of constant concern for inspectors. The Reports of HM Inspectorate  of 
Prisons, under its three most recent Chief Inspectors (Stephen Tumim from 
1987-95, David Ramsbotham 1995 - 2001, Anne Owers, from 2001 to the 
present)  record an ongoing struggle by the Inspectors to define and enforce 
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acceptable standards for the prison service.  This has been against the thrust 
of criminal justice policy under the three most  recent Home Secretaries, 
Michael Howard, Jack Straw, and David Blunkett, since all of them have 
sought to increase the numbers of offenders imprisoned, whereas the Chief 
Inspectors have argued that they  should be substantially reduced. 
 
In Social Services, the routine systems of inspection by SSI have been 
repeatedly overshadowed by a different regulatory method, namely the 
special Committees of Inquiry set up in response to specific high profile cases 
– in particular incidences of failure by the child care services whose purpose 
is to protect the lives and well-being of individual children. The Victoria 
Climbié Inquiry is the latest example of these. But it seems unlikely that the 
investigation of single catastrophes, however meticulous, can provide sound 
evidence on which to  base social policies. The government seems happy to 
demand that professionals adopt evidence-based practices, while their own 
interventions seem more often driven by ideology or expediency.  
 
Measuring comparative performance  
A second objective of current systems is to define and measure the relative or 
comparative performance of providers of services. This has been 
accomplished by devising indicators of quality, and by transforming 
necessarily qualitative measures into numerical indicators, thus making 
possible the ‘scoring’ and ‘ranking’ of institutions and services. The inspection 
systems themselves have sometimes been somewhat coy about this aspect 
of their work. For example, in their oral report to those in a university they 
have just inspected, QUAHE inspectors have been known to decline the 
suggestion to add up the separate scores from their six separate areas of 
assessment into a composite score, even though everyone knows that the 
composite score is the item of most acute concern to everyone. But no-one 
has been deceived by this reluctance to take note of the obvious – what can 
be added up, will be added up. So now ‘league tables’ have an extremely 
important part in both the school and university systems, partly through the 
role of the press. This has been justified on grounds of enhanced ‘consumer 
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choice’. It is claimed that if publics know which are good schools or 
universities, and which are bad, they will be able to choose the good, and 
avoid the bad. So, in effect, a new and improved market has been created, in 
which league table positions, constructed from various indicators and reports 
of inspections, allow objective measures of ‘product quality’ to be obtained. 
Monetary prices to consumers remain for the moment out of this quasi-
market, since most health and education services are still provided without 
charge at the point of use. But the enhanced top-up fees proposed for 
universities will weaken this principle, and it is possible that once Foundation 
Hospitals are established, with their greater autonomy, they will eventually be 
permitted to allow their customers to pay for ‘top-up’ services of extra quality. 
 
The NHS audit systems have so far mainly relied on a star system rather than 
on a serial ranking of Trusts. Those with ‘three stars’ qualify for particular 
financial benefits, and for exemptions from certain kinds of regulation; a ‘three 
star’ ranking is also a precondition for Foundation Status. However, 
comparative rankings and league tables have begun to emerge from various 
sources. Since the measures on which these rankings are based are largely 
secondary to the primary task of the Trusts – namely to treat patients 
effectively3  – these indicators seem to be a particular travesty, of little use to 
patients in trying to decide whether their illness would be better treated by 
Provider A or Provider B. But there is a further difficulty in any notion that 
ranking and star systems are intended to enhance the possibility of ‘patient 
choice’: whereas parents considering a choice of school for their child may 
well have time, resource, and clarity of mind to consider different options, 
many patients are in no such position; they are faced with the shock of illness, 
their lack of medical knowledge, and the urgent need to get something done 
quickly.  
 
                                            
3
 In a recent study, K. Rowan et al., 'Hospital star ratings and clinical outcomes: ecological 
study.' (British Medical Journal (online)  23rd January 04) reported that for adult critical care, 
the one field for which adequate data exist, star ratings do not reflect the quality of clinical care 
provided by hospitals. 'Patients do just as well in a trust with no stars as in one with three 
stars. Crude mortality data are misleading because they ignore the fact that higher rated trusts 
tend to be teaching institutions with patients who are less severely ill than on admission to 
critical care units.' 
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And of course, there is a further problem with all these ‘choice-oriented’ 
systems. This is the problem of equity in provision. If information is made 
available, and individuals are enabled to choose between alternatives, those 
who make the right choices will undoubtedly fare better. But what about those 
who make the wrong choices, or who are less well-informed? Or who find, 
having made a ‘right choice’, that the best places have all been taken up, and 
that they therefore have to settle for an inferior provider? It seems that any 
system of consumer choice will favour those with the capability, time and 
resources to make informed and determined choices – and penalise those 
who lack these. The government continues to proclaim its goal of ensuring, 
through its regulatory systems and increased expenditures, that minimum 
standards for all are maintained, and there is no reason to think that it is not 
successful in this – to a degree. But still, it seems likely that the outcome of a 
system designed to further consumer choice in public services will be an 
increase, not a decrease, in inequalities of provision within it.  
 
There are bound to be as many individual losers as winners in systems of 
consumer choice, since at any given moment there can only be a limited 
number of superior options available. Thus, unless one accepts that greater 
inequality is desirable in itself, the case for a system of ranked and graded 
providers, operating in competition with one another, depends on its success 
in raising average standards, in the medium or long run. Harm to losers in 
such systems (those who find themselves relying on providers labelled as 
inferior) might then be offset by the higher average standard brought about by 
enhanced competition. And ‘special measures’ are in any case taken to 
rescue the immediate casualties of failure, whilst the transfer of customers to 
better providers will also shift resources and give incentives to enhance 
performance. This is the justification for the effectiveness of competition and 
markets in general – good providers flourish and bad ones fail, and, on 
average and in the end, everyone benefits from the competition.  
 
Is this argument valid for services where the vulnerability of consumers is 
large, and their difficulty in making informed choices great? This depends on 
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whether these competitive mechanisms do have as their main effect the 
raising of standards in general, or whether they mainly widen the gaps 
between the standards of the more and less successful providers. But it 
seems likely that advantage and success are cumulative, with positive 
feedback effects as success becomes evident. The most capable staff are 
liable to move to the highest-regarded institutions, as do the most capable or 
advantaged consumers – which is no insignificant matter for the performance 
of a school or university. It may even be significant for a health provider, 
where oversubscription by needy and disadvantaged patients may have 
negative effects on its output standards. Far from reported failure stimulating 
greater effort, it may bring its own negative feedback, with loss of confidence, 
flight of clients and staff, and declining resources, all making it difficult to 
achieve ‘turnarounds’ from poor performance to good.  
 
It seems certain that the commitment to ranking and competition is a part of 
an ideology which endorses structured inequalities in the quality of public 
service provision. The enhanced ‘choice’ that publics are held to demand 
includes opportunities to be superior and more privileged than others, not 
merely different from them. The enlarged middle class, who are the main 
electoral drivers of this priority, are individualist and competitive by ideological 
formation. Contradictory impulses on these questions struggle in the soul of 
the Labour Party, the goal of higher common standards contesting with that of 
enhancing opportunities to succeed in an unequal society. There seems little 
doubt about which side in this argument has been winning over recent 
decades. In so far as audit regimes provide measures and indicators of 
relative quality as one of their principal outputs, they serve the purposes of 
maintaining a system of unequal provision. (The current debate about 
variable funding for universities illuminates this implicit debate. Not long ago 
the regulatory system aimed to maintain a common standard for all 
universities, but the implications of current policy are that hierarchy between 
universities needs to be established and supported.)  
 
Improving Quality 
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The third potential objective of inspection and audit systems is for me the 
most interesting, though it is also the most neglected. This is the objective of 
improving quality and performance, not indirectly through the incentive or 
punitive effects of published rankings, indicators, or reports, but directly, 
through the learning that could take place during the interactions between 
inspectors and those they inspect, and in the preparations for and outcomes 
of inspections. How far is the experience of inspection and audit one which 
contributes directly to the enhancement of quality, and how far could it be 
expected, or indeed designed, to do this? One critical issue to consider here 
is whether this objective is consistent with the other two primary objectives 
identified above, or whether it is in competition with them, or indeed 
compromised by them. How far do choices have to be made between these 
different purposes, and the procedures, cultures and methodologies 
appropriate to them? 
 
My experience as a member of staff groups who have been subject to 
inspections is that – although there is often acknowledged to have been some 
benefit from them in terms of improved practice – the gain is generally felt to 
be disappointingly small. The huge commitments required to meet the formal 
demands of inspections – the production of statements of purpose, the 
descriptions of procedures, the preparation of data, the planning of meetings, 
the establishment of adequate ‘audit trails’ – are often felt to bring a small 
return in what is learned during an inspection. Great anxiety is often followed 
by disillusionment, where inspection seems unable, through its protocols, to 
engage with the particulars  of what it is looking at. Hopes that genuine 
dialogue or new insight will be provided by this process are too often dashed.  
 
Some bad experiences of this kind are inevitable, and need not in themselves 
discredit the process. But I believe the problem to be more systemic than this, 
and that it is often manifest even when inspection teams are functioning 
reasonably well according to their procedures. The problem derives from the 
priority given in these systems to the first and the second of the objectives 
outlined above, as opposed to the third. Improving quality through interaction 
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with those inspected simply isn’t the main task of most inspection systems, 
nor the reason for which they were set up.  
 
The two dominant objectives of most inspections – the assurance of 
acceptable common standards and establishing indicators to justify ranking 
by merit – have had a profound influence on the procedures they follow. 
Failure to meet standards can lead to sanction, while success or failure in the 
achievement of good rankings also brings reward or sanction. Because of 
this, criteria of fairness and probity have become central to the whole 
process, since in their absence, given the major implications of the results, 
those inspected and judged would claim that outcomes were ill-founded, 
biased, or unjust. To maintain fairness and probity, it is necessary that 
inspectors function according to standard procedures, following criteria for 
making assessments which are as objective and uniform as possible. Thus, 
although inspectors are normally drawn from the professional fields which are 
being inspected, their specific training as inspectors is in the procedures and 
criteria of evaluation – and not in the problems of assessing, still less of 
improving, the quality of work in their particular field. 
 
The effect of this approach is to flatten out, and diminish in their importance, 
the differences between, institutions and practices, since it is what they have 
in common which is of most relevance to auditors, not what is distinctive or 
unique about them. This tendency to standardisation has impacted 
significantly on the practices of institutions. For example, in higher education, 
it is required that the entire process of a course be described in writing, in a 
‘validated’ course document which is given to students, and can be used by 
them to guide their own studies. These specifications are also seen as the 
‘terms and conditions of purchase’ by students of the educational ‘product’, 
though it is doubtful if this consumerist conception is appropriate to 
educational provision.  
 
In some ways this has been a beneficial process, bringing about a higher 
standard of preparation of syllabuses, reading lists and assessment 
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requirements than might otherwise have been the case. But there has also 
been a tendency to homogenise and standardise not only the written 
description, but also the practice of a course, in order to meet regulatory 
requirements. Deviations from the norm are regarded as prospective 
problems, not as creative innovations. Furthermore, the norms of description 
which have evolved – no doubt for purposes of comparability, and to enable 
standard ‘benchmarks’ to be developed – have become removed from the 
way in which a sensible teacher might want to describe a course, or in which 
any sensible student might want to read about it. If every unit and every 
course has to be described in the same way as every other, it can almost be 
guaranteed than none of them will appear very interesting. 
 
Indeed, a drive to homogenisation and standardisation of all procedures and 
practices seems endemic in these systems; it is part of the autopoeitic 
production (as Niklas Luhmann calls it)4 of an institution’s sovereignty over 
the processes which take place within its boundaries. Inspection regimes 
invade the mentalities of the primary providers they regulate, as their 
demands are internalised, as well as responded to by calculation. Differences 
tend to be defined, a priori, as tending to unfairness. Why should some 
students have to write more essays than others, be taught for more weeks 
than others, have curriculum units of different sizes? I have sometimes felt 
that this process will only reach its conclusion when every university course in 
the UK, if not eventually the world, is identical in every respect except its 
specific subject content. It has become hard to sustain the view that 
difference can be a source of positive value.  
 
This process is part of a larger context in which the demand for measurement 
is unduly influencing the practices that are being measured. Because core 
professional practices in education, health care or social services tend to be 
too complex, subtle and variable to be easily categorised, proxies for these 
practices are selected which do lend themselves to standard description and 
measurement. This means that, for instance, the frames placed over 
                                            
4
  See Niklas Luhmann, Risk: a Sociological Theory (1993). 
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educational practices in universities to assess their quality filter out a great 
deal of the specific quality of learning interactions in the cause of producing 
reliable measures. The measuring of waiting lists, or time elapsed before 
appointments, is a comparable distortion in health care. Of course getting to 
see a doctor is a necessary condition of being treated successfully, but its 
importance has to be balanced against an assessment of what happens once 
an appointment takes place, and how urgent the condition was in the first 
place. The latter is hard to measure, the former relatively easy, so this is what 
assessments have focused attention on. The question is whether such 
measures are assessing what is most important.  
 
Since governments have instigated this process not only in order to improve 
these systems, but also to demonstrate to their electorates that they are 
improving them, a further distortion enters the picture, since appearances 
may, for the latter purpose, be what matter most.  
 
Improving quality and organisational change 
Improving quality self-evidently entails change. In organisations providing 
education, health and social care, achieving this is usually a complex and 
multi-dimensional affair. The ‘national literacy hour’ and additional stages of 
assessment were among the few ‘quick fixes’ that were ever available in this 
sphere. They were means of doing one or two ‘big things’, across a whole 
sector, that could probably make a difference. But most of the time it is 
difficult to get staff – as individuals or groups – or organisations to do things 
differently from the way they already do them. The more complex and 
differentiated a process of production, the more this is the case, and the less 
centralised systems of command and control will work. 
 
One notices, for example, even in strong and effective organisations, how 
little transfer of good practice there seems to be between one specialism and 
another, even when managers understand that such transfers would be 
desirable. Staff have a relatively high degree of tenure in these fields, 
compared with others (this is in part a function of the value of their ‘local 
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knowledge’ to their organisation); so it is hard to achieve improvements by the 
method of removing staff and appointing replacements. Work is often 
dependent on teams, and on their shared experience and understanding. 
Quality depends on ongoing relationships, including ongoing relationships 
with clients, pupils or patients. Changes are therefore likely to have beneficial 
effects, for good or ill, only after ‘working through’, and over a period of time. 
It is not surprising that, in the few empirical studies that have been made of 
quality of performance in such organisations (such as Michael Rutter et al’s 
classic study of primary schools, Fifteen Thousand Hours), leadership, staff 
morale, and organisational cohesion account for most of the variances in 
performance.53 
 
These factors suggest that in these ‘social’ sectors there are likely to be 
serious problems in balancing the goals of achieving acceptable standards, 
establishing relative merits or rankings, and bringing about desirable changes. 
Each of these goals of inspection, and the activities associated with them, 
generates a different occupational culture and mentality.  
 
For example, faced with prospective disgrace and sanction for falling below 
standard, organisations will conceal truths, and develop solidarity, even 
paranoia, towards the outside. This is not the state of mind in which 
deficiencies and limitations are readily thought about or admitted. The 
motivation for achieving high inspection scores, or avoiding low ones, may 
include  more expansive attitudes than simple fear of failure, but the need to 
succeed will also encourage a concern for appearances over attention to 
reality. Such preoccupation with self-presentation is a feature of most of these 
inspection systems.  
 
If the aim is to find out what could be improved in an organisation, and to 
think about how to bring improvements about, a different state of mind is 
                                            
5
  The audit system has substantially taken the place of what should be independent social 
scientific investigation. Standardised measures – a poor-quality, Fordist, kind of social science 
– substitute for inquiring and critical investigations of institutional practices (such as the Rutter 
study). The public resources devoted to the inspection system far exceeds the budget of the 
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called for. This requires, above all, trust – between colleagues, in 
organisational superiors, and in external inspectors who are having to bring 
bad as well as good news. Trust is needed because improvement is not 
possible without prior acknowledgement of weakness or deficiency (without 
this, why would improvement be necessary?); and no-one is going to explore 
their own deficiencies willingly if they believe they are going to be punished 
when these are discovered. 
 
Of course this is the difficult situation in which teachers, therapists, 
organisational consultants – and indeed wise managers – find themselves, on 
a daily basis. They wish to bring about the equivalent of ‘improvements in 
quality’, in an individual or collective client’s life or work. To do this they have 
to find a space in which weaknesses can be honestly contemplated, and in 
which the challenge and risk of doing something differently can be tolerated. 
This requires, above all, a non-judgemental attitude, an understanding that 
the consultant/teacher/therapist has been there too, in some way or another, 
and a willingness to share at least some of the emotional burdens of the task. 
The process of improvement requires, in short, an identification with those 
with whom such work is taking place.  
 
Thus, for teachers, perception and acknowledgement of what is not perfect in 
the learners has to be accompanied by respect and concern for the learners 
themselves. In practice, in educational contexts the functions of ‘teaching’ and 
‘assessment’ are sometimes divided, with ‘the exams’ coming at the end of a 
teaching process, and even seeming to be the responsibility of a different 
entity (‘the examiners’) – though in practice these may include the same 
people. Some teachers may find it more comfortable to ally themselves with 
the students in their ordeal at the hands of a remote examining board, though 
this is a solution perhaps based on a reluctance to take on some of the 
responsibilities of the teacherly role. Nothing can be less like this ‘learning 
relationship’ than the usual connection between inspectors and inspected, 
which is brief in duration, impersonal in tone, and lacking in commitment to 
                                                                                                                             
Economic and Social Research Council. The first head of Ofsted was ideologically hostile to  
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anything much, apart from probity and fairness in the discharge of the task. 
Often, inspectors and assessors are individuals who have themselves opted 
out of lasting institutional commitments, and are now working as part-time 
contractors. This situation may enhance their sense of detachment.  
 
Reports by the HM Inspector of Prisons are based on a different approach. 
They are remarkably direct in their descriptions,  and lack the distancing from 
reality through abstractions and protocols that characterise most of the other 
inspection formats. They are sometimes moving documents to read,  in their 
commitment to improvement, which one would hardly say of most inspection 
reports.  Tumim successfully campaigned for the abolition of the practice of 
'slopping out'.  Ramsbotham made the respect accorded to prisoners by  staff 
a key measure  of the quality of  prison regimes. The Inspectorate of Prisons 
has sustained a position  independent of government, while most of the 
others have been the enforcers of its 'modernising' agenda.      
 
I am not wishing to argue that one of the three sets of objectives in audit and 
inspection – perhaps the ‘softest’ and most ‘qualitative’ – should be given 
priority over all the others. My case is rather that, unless we understand what 
these different objectives are, and how they compete and conflict with one 
another, we will never develop procedures and cultures which actually 
improve practice and the quality of services. 
 
Different beliefs about motivation 
These different perspectives on assessment – what one might call the 
sanctioning, competitive, and learning approaches – stem from different 
assumptions about human motivation and different conceptions of what is 
socially possible and desirable.6 The sanctioning approach is committed 
above all to the necessity for compliance with obligations and standards. 
Those who advocated audit and inspection as a new regime of regulation did 
                                            
6
  These different inspection practices map on to Amitai Etzioni’s three models of compliance 
set out in A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations (1961). Etzioni distinguishes 
between mainly coercive institutions, institutions which function chiefly through material 
rewards, and institutions which rely on moral consensus and solidarity for their cohesion and 
solidarity.  
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so because they were disillusioned with the main institutions that had 
previously been responsible for ensuring compliance, namely traditional 
bureaucracies.5 The quality of public services was supposed, traditionally, to 
be secured by compliance to law, by just and fair appointment processes, and 
by the existence of ordered hierarchies in government services. Subsequently 
it was argued that these systems no longer functioned effectively, that they 
had been ‘captured’ by their employees, etc. However, the new regulatory 
systems designed to 'modernise'  the old in fact operate with similar 
motivational assumptions. Instead of direct regulation and control, through 
bureaucratic hierarchies, there is now indirect regulation and control, through 
quasi-independent agencies which nevertheless act with the force and power 
of law. The indirectness of this form of governance has enabled government 
to exercise huge power, whilst escaping direct political accountability for it. 
Indeed it is made to appear that the real power lies in impersonal systems 
and criteria, and not in human agents at all. This system has reproduced in its 
turn the defects of the earlier compliance-oriented systems it was intended to 
replace, namely pseudo-compliance, alienation of staff, and rigidity and 
ritualism in task-performance.  
 
Competitive approaches to inspection, via rankings and merit stars, seek to 
mobilise the desire for reward, power and prestige, rather than merely the 
desire to avoid disgrace and failure. They do undoubtedly mobilise 
competitive efforts, and may galvanise mechanisms for improvement and 
learning within competing organisations. As already noted, there is little 
evidence about the effects of these systems, one way or another. But it would 
be interesting to learn whether the competitive pressures brought about by 
these systems have in fact led to development within them, and to changes in 
their relative success, or whether they have merely reproduced existing 
differences in resource and capability. The evidence of the universities is that 
the entrenchment of performance scores and league tables as a result of 
audit systems has frozen the pre-existing institutional hierarchy. This is hardly 
a surprising outcome given that the government is so committed to 
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inequalities – termed ‘excellence’ – in this and other public spheres. Both the 
‘sanction’ and ‘competitive’ models of regulation are essentially individualist 
and interest-oriented, rather than solidaristic and value-oriented.  
 
The ‘learning model’ makes different assumptions about productive 
motivations, believing in relationship, trust, and co-operation as the 
preconditions for development, not only within institutions, but also in their 
transactions with external authorities. David Marquand elaborated these 
differences of philosophical view in The Unprincipled Society (1988), where 
he advocated the idea of a society committed to learning.  He argued against 
the domination of the modes of command and exchange, and instead for 
commitment to the mode of persuasion, to the idea that the citizen could be 
regarded as 'a reflective and open-minded being, capable of rising above his 
particular interests in order to make a judgement of the general interest, and 
willing to revise his judgement in the light of arguments advanced by his 
fellow-citizens.'  Marquand's view comes from the tradition usually thought of 
as idealist, which currently has few advocates in Britain.  New Labour’s 
commitment to ‘modernise’ the public services is largely constructed on 
individualist assumptions, continuous with those of the previous Conservative 
governments, though more inclusive if not more egalitarian in aim.  What 
remains absent from, indeed disliked by,  New Labour, is an alternative 
conception of ‘the public’ and ‘the social’ as representing a different kind of 
solidarity and commitment. These ideas are viscerally regarded as a mere 
ideological masquerade for the self-interest of public sector professions and 
unions.  
 
It was no accident that the first chief Inspector of OFSTED, Chris Woodhead, 
designer of the Thatcherite template for public sector inspection systems, 
remained in office for three years after New Labour came to office. He was 
both hostile to teachers and committed to methods of inspection that 
depended on sanction and competition as their primary motivational levers. 
Yet the type of regime of audit and inspection he instituted now provides the 
‘micro-structure’ of regulation of our increasingly individualised, though also 
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heavily governed society. It is one of its distinctive regimes of power. (The 
Foucauldian tradition in social theory provides many useful concepts for 
analysing such regimes.)  
 
An alternative system of inspection and audit? 
It is possible, I believe, to devise a method of audit and inspection that is 
committed to the achievement of common agreed standards, in each sphere 
of public provision, but is also committed to shared learning and the 
improvement of practice. But it is doubtful whether these objectives could be 
combined with the other major goal of current audit systems – the generation 
of evidence on which competitive rankings can be based. It would be 
possible, however, to achieve a consensus about what basic standards 
should be – even about desirable improvements in these over time – that 
would not divide the inspected from inspectors. (Those whose offences are 
tried in courts of law are not usually divided from their judges by profoundly 
different conceptions of right and wrong, but rather by different views of their 
own particular circumstances and deserts.) Indeed, one can envisage that the 
first task of any audit and inspection system would be to establish, through 
quantitative and qualitative indicators, where an institution or agency stands in 
regard to these accepted norms – perhaps taking into account its particular 
situation regarding location, clientele, etc – and then to make 
recommendations for remedy and improvement which would have the force of 
obligation. 
 
But once that threshold of adequacy has been achieved, a different role 
becomes appropriate for systems of inspection. This is to clarify what is 
distinctive and particular about the goals of an agency or institution, by 
requiring it to formulate these, and to identify criteria for their evaluation and 
assessment. A presupposition of this process would be that agencies in these 
fields are inherently different from one another, and that such differences can 
be a source of value. The government has to some degree moved towards 
such an acknowledgement in its advocacy of ‘specialist schools’, and even 
‘foundation hospitals’ – though it is clear that other purposes, favouring not 
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only difference but also enhanced stratification and ranking, are mixed up with 
this.  
 
In the kind of regime I am describing, inspectors would be required to 
consider specifications of purpose, and to report on achievements in relation 
to these, in ways which took account of their particularity. Measures of 
assessment that were appropriate and relevant to some agencies would not 
be so relevant to others. Audits would be required first to report on how far 
institutions met basic objectives. But they would then go on to report on how 
well they were doing on other criteria, partly identified by the agency 
concerned, and partly from the pool of relevant knowledge and criteria which 
inspectors would bring to their task.  
 
In particular, agencies would be expected to demonstrate their commitment to 
and capacity for improvement, against the criteria they agree with inspectors, 
and the task of inspection would be in part to explore their success or 
difficulties with this process. One of the purposes of inspectors would be, in 
consultancy or facilitation mode, to assist and catalyse this process, from their 
own knowledge and experience. This might require an insistence that 
different elements of an institution are brought together, that acknowledged or 
discovered problems are discussed and analysed, and that follow-up reports 
are submitted on progress achieved. This would become a much more open-
ended and thus variable process, but it might also be one that was more vital 
and productive.  
 
Compliance is in any case not much use as a habit of mind in a competitive 
world in which innovation is necessary to create value. A process of 
inspection and audit which encourages innovation and discovery might, one 
would hope, have some effects ‘all the way down’, on the habits of 
managements, staff, and pupils and clients themselves. Our present systems 
of regulation by contrast encourage standardisation, defensive self-
presentation, and risk-avoidance, and this goes all the way down too. 
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Among the inspectors in such a system there would need to be capable 
innovators and facilitators, whose satisfaction and reputation would come 
from success in influencing and catalysing good practice. It does not seem to 
me that many people now join inspection services because they believe that 
this is going to be their best opportunity to bring about innovations, though 
this was the case at an earlier stage in an organisation like the ILEA, where 
educational developments were initiated and guided through its advisory 
services. Such an approach would also have an implication for what 
institutions would themselves need to do to work successfully in this 
environment. Instead of the risk-avoiders and compliance-specialists for 
which the present system now selects, one would hope to see ‘quality 
innovators’ and ‘quality entrepreneurs’ become the key figures in these 
processes – as developers of new programmes became in the early days of 
the new universities. Indeed the presence of individuals taking such roles 
would be a sign of health in such institutions.  
 
Much stress is now laid by government on responsiveness to customers and 
customer-satisfaction as criteria of good practice and good governance. It 
would be possible for an inspection system to be oriented towards ‘consumer 
involvement’ if the reports on which it was based, and the rituals of discussion 
and reflection which it generated, were made accessible to publics, especially 
to the local communities which provide the clients for a service. I don’t think 
one could read an average OFSTED Report and imagine that it would form a 
lively basis for a public institutional review. But one could imagine the design 
of a different kind of reporting document, intended to be read by all members 
and associates of an agency as well as by inspectors, which could form the 
basic text for ‘hearings’ to be held in public. This might take the form of a 
Report by an institution to its members and clients, which an inspecting body, 
as part of its remit, would question and discuss. The inspectors’ own report 
would subsequently make a further contribution to this assessment, which in 
any case would have to include genuine self-assessment to be productive. 
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There has to be some tension in such proceedings for them to have value 
and authenticity; the confrontation between those submitting a report and 
inspectors would thus necessarily include elements of uncertainty and 
potential for conflict. It would indeed be this potential for difficulty, and its 
experience from time to time, which would signify that this democratic process 
was a genuine one. Skills and roles would need to be developed for the 
operation of a system oriented towards self-reflection and improvement, but 
this would be of benefit in itself. Indeed it is hard to see that ‘user 
involvement’ in public services will ever amount to much unless procedures 
and practices which make possible the exercise of ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’, in 
Albert Hirschman’s terms, as well as customer ‘exit’ are brought into being. 
 
Conclusion 
It is not my purpose to argue against the principle or practice of the 
accountability of public services and public institutions; nor am I asking for 
inspectors to ‘go away and leave us alone’, though it is perhaps 
understandable that many professionals do react in this way, in response to 
what they see as the oppressiveness and mindlessness of their regulatory 
regimes  – though of course sometimes it is simply because they do not want 
anyone to disturb them. 
 
On the contrary, I am in favour of a lively system of audit and inspection, but 
one which has as one of its principal goals to stimulate, facilitate, and support 
ongoing improvements in practice. I think this goal is consistent with that of 
improving common standards. Once these basic aims are met, the work of 
improvement and innovation can begin, within a  different culture and 
practice. I don’t think that such a system can also be used to provide data to 
effect the competitive ranking of public providers without damage to its 
quality-enhancing function. Of course, informal and formal rankings will be 
made anyway, by a host of people and media. But just as organisational 
consultants do not go around marking their clients out of ten, and  publishing 
their marks, so must institutional auditors maintain a distance between their 
work and such competitive measurement. They should seek instead to 
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promote self-understanding and change among their clients, and, through 
publication and circulation, in the wider community. 
 
Systems of inspection and accountability could become a form of democratic 
empowerment, encouraging collective identification with the public sphere. 
New means of citizens’ involvement are urgently needed to revitalise 
democratic practices, which are currently being eroded by the ‘mediatisation’ 
of politics, and by the decline of political parties as communities of conviction.  
 
The present government proclaims a commitment to improve and ‘modernise’ 
public services, and has belatedly increased investment in them. But it does 
not seem to have a conception of what is distinctively ‘public’ about a public 
service, except that its users do not pay for it at the point of use. Its dominant 
concept of ‘modernisation’ is based on the same assumptions about 
individual self-interest and the necessity for market competition as those that 
prevail in the market sector. The micro-regime of regulation developed in 
recent years has been in part the instrument of this conception. This article 
suggests an alternative view, one which gives predominant emphasis to co-
operation and trust, and to the common pursuit of improvement.  
 
x-x-x-x 
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